

**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

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**STRATEGIC VISION FOR THEATER INTELLIGENCE:
SUPPORTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
21ST CENTURY WARFIGHTER**

BY

**COMMANDER LAURA J. SPROWLS
United States Navy**

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**STRATEGIC VISION FOR THEATER INTELLIGENCE:
SUPPORTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 21ST CENTURY WARFIGHTER**

by
Commander Laura J. Sprowls
United States Navy

Colonel Stuart Herrington
Project Advisor

U.S. Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Laura J. Sprowls, CDR, USN

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The U.S. intelligence community is facing an era of profound and revolutionary change. Several key factors are driving this change, chief among them are: a new threat environment, rapid technological advances, the explosion in information processing, an emphasis on jointness, compressed decision-making time cycles and declining resources. The focus of this paper is on theater intelligence and how it is coping with these changes to meet the needs of the 21st century warfighter. This project examines the evolution of theater intelligence from 1989 to the present and the imperative for change. It argues for a long-range planning and a visioning process, presents basic principles which provide the underpinnings for theater intelligence, and introduces guiding foundations for its future success. U.S. Pacific Command's strategic vision for theater intelligence is presented as an example of how to embrace change and keep intelligence relevant in a dynamic world. It introduces three fundamental and interlocking strategies of partnership, information and training which frame the vision. The goal of the vision is singular, to significantly enhance intelligence support to theater warfighters. The project concludes that the challenge for theater intelligence is to achieve the vision or risk becoming irrelevant to the warfighter and the nation.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. intelligence community is facing an era of profound and revolutionary change. The days when highly compartmented intelligence from national sources would be quietly briefed to a senior commander are giving way to those in which all-source information will be available nearly instantaneously to virtually all echelons of command. Several key factors are driving this change, chief among them are: a new threat environment, rapid technological advances, the explosion in information processing, an emphasis on jointness, compressed decision-making time cycles and declining resources. How well the intelligence community deals with these changes may determine how U.S. power fares into the next century.

The focus of this paper is on theater intelligence and how it is coping with change to meet the needs of the 21st century warfighter. The paper begins by examining the evolution of theater intelligence from 1989 to the present and the imperative for change. It argues why long-range planning and a visioning process are key, presents basic principles which provide the underpinnings for theater intelligence, and introduces guiding foundations for its future success.

To successfully manage the transformation of theater intelligence, this paper proposes that a clearly articulated vision of its future state will be essential to both the intelligence community and the warfighter. U.S. Pacific Command's strategic vision for theater intelligence is presented as an example of how to embrace change and keep intelligence relevant in a dynamic world. This strategic vision is based on three fundamental and interlocking strategies of partnership, information and training. The goal of the vision is singular, to significantly enhance intelligence support to theater warfighters. A strategic vision which guides the transition into the future will keep theater intelligence relevant and useful to the nation's warfighters, and ultimately the nation.

THE EVOLUTION OF THEATER INTELLIGENCE

"In establishing a Joint Intelligence Center at each combatant command, we have improved the quality of intelligence support to the warfighter while decreasing the resources required to produce such support."¹

--CJCS Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, February 1993

Events from 1989 to 1991 defined the foundations for theater intelligence and the basic precepts for the future. The "threat" changed radically, shifting focus and analysis away from the former Soviet Union to regional issues and the emerging "new world order." Jointness took effect and the stand-up of Joint Intelligence Centers inaugurated the restructuring of theater intelligence to meet joint warfighting requirements. Personnel and resource cuts of nearly 25 percent during this period dictated the streamlining of operations while the Bush administration's Cooperative Engagement Strategy further expanded intelligence requirements and change. Operation DESERT STORM produced intelligence lessons learned which were later incorporated into theater planning. Reviewing these lessons-learned is important as they continue to influence the direction in which theater intelligence is now evolving.

A congressional study of U.S. wartime intelligence support released in 1993 provided a snapshot of how theater intelligence fared in its first post-Cold War conflict. It rated theater intelligence collection as "very good" (but "with some major problems"), intelligence analysis as "mixed," and dissemination as "very poor." The common denominator at the theater level was the absence of a unifying intelligence architecture - systems, concepts, and organizations. Other specific

deficiencies included: (1) the lack of communications capacity for intelligence dissemination; (2) poor collection asset allocation and intelligence dissemination due to Service, agency and command parochialism; 3) the inability to convert raw information to useful intelligence; and (4) a poor understanding of intelligence capabilities among combat commanders.²

From 1992 to 1995 the rate of change within theater intelligence intensified. Further intelligence community downsizing made duplication and competitive analysis unaffordable and demanded additional streamlining. New missions such as Humanitarian Assistance, Nation Assistance, Counterdrugs, Counterterrorism, Peacekeeping, and Peace Enforcement were most frequently occupying our military forces and changing the focus of their intelligence requirements.

Alvin and Heidi Toffler captured these new requirements well when they noted that:

“Rather than detecting and analyzing a jet aircraft which emits a familiar visual infrared, and telemetry signal . . . the intelligence community may have to detect and analyze old, small aircraft transporting drugs. Rather than spotting tank battalions in movement, it may have to spot guerillas. Fighting terrorism, in particular, requires extremely fine-grained information and new computerized techniques for getting it.”³

New precision weapons also required finer detail, enhanced timeliness and tailoring of targeting information for the warfighter. The revolution in information technologies has permitted intelligence products and services to evolve away from “hard copy” to “soft copy” and from message traffic “push” to on-line customer “pull.” Finally, the increased focus on multilateral military activities brought attendant challenges to theater intelligence as it heretofore lacked a coherent, interoperable intelligence architecture for information exchange between joint theater forces and releasable databases for our allies and coalition partners.

IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE

“Reinvent intelligence now, or watch it go away.”⁴
-- Robert D. Steele

A monumental debate is ongoing concerning the future roles and missions of the U.S. intelligence community, yet there appears to be general agreement that U.S. intelligence has entered a period of historic transformation. Some experts contend that economically and politically it is a reality that the United States must engage the post-Cold War world with a smaller, more cost-effective intelligence capability.⁵ Still others argue that to head off trouble before it explodes, the U.S. should use its intelligence apparatus and its military forces to help the world deal with problems like hunger, disaster and pollution that can throw desperate populations into violent conflict. To do this would require more, not less, intelligence, but different types as well.⁶ As the transformation of the intelligence community emerges at the dawn of the 21st century, it must delimit the “why”, the “how” and the “what” of intelligence support to the warfighter.

Richard Best, in a report for Congress, suggests there are three primary factors that contribute to the widespread belief that there should be significant changes in the intelligence efforts of the Defense Department. These are: (1) the implications of defense reorganization resulting from the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986; (2) the need for sharp budgetary cutbacks dictated by the end of the Cold War and other economic realities; and (3) the dramatic technological innovations demonstrated in the use of intelligence resources during Operation DESERT STORM.

Further consensus for change is articulated in the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement; “This strategy requires that we take steps to reinforce current intelligence capabilities . . . within the limits of our resources.” Some key intelligence goals listed in the NSS

are to: (1) ensure timely intelligence support to military operations; (2) develop new strategies for collection, production and dissemination (including closer relationships between intelligence producers and consumers) to make intelligence products more responsive to current consumer needs; (3) streamline intelligence operations and organizations to gain efficiency and integration; and (4) revise long-standing security restrictions where possible to make intelligence data more useful to intelligence consumers.⁷

The Tofflers captured the essence of why the intelligence community must change the way it operates when they noted that:

“... as the Third Wave war-form takes shape, either intelligence itself assumes a Third Wave form, meaning it reflects the new role of information, communication, and knowledge in society, or it becomes costly, irrelevant, or dangerously misleading.”⁸

Additionally, operational characteristics of future forces are being postulated that point toward profound changes in the conduct of future warfare. Each of the military services is trying to get in front of change with strategic visions such as the Army’s “Force XXI,” the Navy’s “Forward . . . From the Sea,” the Air Force’s “Global Reach, Global Power” and the Marine Corps’ “Operational Maneuver From the Sea.” What do the nation’s senior military leaders think will be essential for intelligence support to the future warfighter? Former Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan envisions that the warfighter in the information age will need:

“... a shared situational awareness resulting from having common, up-to-date, near complete friendly and enemy information, distributed among the elements of a Task Force.”⁹

He further states that:

“ . . . the information age organization (read “intelligence community”) must seek to provide near simultaneous, continuous, short-run production of mass-customized products, precisely targeted with near instantaneous distribution.”¹⁰

Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William A. Owens predicts that as early as the year 2005 there will be:

“...a battlefield 200 by 200 miles in which you know almost everything that matters to you. Advanced sensors and information fusion will be expected to provide near-perfect, real-time discrimination between targets and non-targets.”¹¹

General Charles Horner, Commander of U.S. and allied air components during the Persian Gulf war, articulated a future requirement for:

“...not only accurate, near real-time situational awareness but also for knowledge of enemy intentions to ensure future U.S. success. U.S. commanders will need to know not only what the enemy is doing, but also what he is going to do.”¹²

The emerging picture of this future battlefield centers on an integrated system of battlefield assets - a reconnaissance-strike complex ¹³ - that offers significant, if not orders of magnitude, increases in present collection, processing, and dissemination capabilities.

The political process will also influence the future of U.S. intelligence. Congress has chartered a bipartisan Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the U.S. Intelligence Community to complete a study of intelligence reform in 1996. The commission's charter is to “evaluate and define the need for intelligence in the post-Cold War environment.”¹⁴ The challenge for the intelligence community is to contribute to this historic reform debate by stating what is feasible, by establishing explicit goals and priorities, by matching limited resources with limited objectives and by leveraging emerging capabilities.

Angelo Codevilla, a senior staff member on the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence from 1977 to 1985 and an internationally recognized expert on the craft of intelligence, offers an approach to intelligence reform that is simple, sound and straightforward. He states that:

“... true reform does not consist of procedures, budgets or of drawing bureaucratic wiring

diagrams, much less of bureaucratic vendettas. It consists of figuring out how the needs of the future differ from what present bureaucracies can deliver, and then acting dispassionately. It requires an unusual capacity on the part of officials to see their objectives and to keep their eyes on them.”¹⁵

In essence, the imperative for change is a driving force behind the requirement to reshape the vision of intelligence for the coming decades.

THE POWER OF STRATEGIC VISION

“If you don’t know where you’re going, you might end up someplace else.”

-- Yogi Berra

Planning in an uncertain world is a tough challenge for the intelligence community but it must be done to remain relevant to the national security process. This paper suggests that this can be achieved through a strategic visioning process.

A strategic vision is a mental model of the future state of a process, a group or an organization that can only be brought about by commitment and actions. Vision is about innovation, creativity, and divestiture of old paradigms. It involves thinking long-range, unlocking new perspectives for the future and planning for them. A compelling vision can pull individuals and organizations to their desired futures. Landing a man on the moon in a decade was the vision that John F. Kennedy held out as an inspiring magnet pulling an entire nation together to develop the technological capability for manned space flight.

Powerful and transforming visions like these tend to have special properties according to futurist Burt Nanus. Specifically they: 1) are appropriate for the organization and the times; 2) provide a realistic and informed assessment of what is attainable in the future; 3) set standards of excellence and reflect high ideals; 4) clarify purpose and direction; 5) inspire enthusiasm and encourage commitment; 6) are well articulated and easily understood; 7) reflect the uniqueness of the organization (what it stands for; what it’s able to achieve); and 8) are ambitious and expand the organization’s horizons.¹⁶

For a balanced view of what vision can and cannot accomplish, Nanus emphasizes what vision is not. Vision is not a prophecy nor is it a mission. Mission states purpose, not direction. Vision is

not factual; it does not exist and may not be realized as originally imagined. It should not be considered true or false. A vision can only be evaluated relative to other possible directions. It is never static or enunciated once for all time, rather it is a dynamic process. Finally, vision does not put a constraint on actions but it is designed to unleash and orient energies of an organization in a common direction.¹⁷

Strategic vision and long-range planning efforts are inextricably linked; having one without the other is difficult. The problem is that American institutions, including the military, have traditionally had a pragmatic, fragmented, short-term focus. We lack effective systems for systematic, long range planning and an ability to think about future agendas. Most military leaders hold their positions for relatively short periods of time and tend to have “planning horizons” which correspond with the length of their tour of duty. Most demands for resource cuts reflect short-range political pressures or agendas and most approaches to these cuts are ad hoc and reactionary. Major General Perry M. Smith (Ret.), former Commandant of the National War College, presents several laws of long-range planning in an article entitled “Long-Range Planning: A National Necessity.” These can be summarized as follows: to be successful, a long-range planning process must have and maintain the support of the top decision maker and it must be institutionalized within the organization. The long-range planning process must remain flexible and avoid constraining the innovation and divestiture process. All plans must be reviewed periodically to ensure they are not too rigid or out of date. Long-range plans should not be constrained by budget, technology, or time. Planners must be willing to recommend the divestiture of organizations, processes and products.¹⁸ Without an integrated long-range planning process it is virtually impossible to create and maintain strategic vision in an organization. Without strategic vision effective preparation for the future is impossible.

STRATEGIC VISION FOR THEATER INTELLIGENCE

“Putting timely and useful intelligence into the hands of our operational commanders is the *raison d'être* of military intelligence.”¹⁹

-- Lt. Gen. Leonard H. Peroots, USAF (Ret.)

The strategic vision for theater intelligence presented as an example in this paper is one that I and others worked on while assigned to the J2 staff at USCINCPAC. Although it was created for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), its concepts and strategies are universal and therefore, I believe, can be applied in any theater of operations or at any level of intelligence support.

The strategic vision for theater intelligence must reflect the CINC's Intelligence Intent and guide all theater intelligence activities, planning and courses of action. It should be captured in a clear, concise statement of policy which all participants can easily understand. PACOM's statement of strategic vision for theater intelligence consists of four simple, declarative sentences:

“Intelligence exists to support warfighters. PACOM will actively seek out and participate in an interlocking network of partnerships to guarantee broad access to quality intelligence. Intelligence will be on-line and interactive, offering all echelons of command near-instantaneous access, as a critical element of C4I. PACOM will invest in realistic, challenging training for our people to ensure they are fully prepared to provide quality intelligence to warfighters.”²⁰

Significant implications for both intelligence professionals and the forces they support fall out of this vision statement. The implications begin with the first statement that intelligence exists to support warfighters. This defines the customer and the focus of the intelligence effort. Warfighters, in this paper, are the Joint Task Force (JTF) and its components (air, ground, naval, marine, and special operations). It also focuses attention on the need to produce intelligence with the detail required to perform service-specific roles and missions. It foresees delivery of intelligence in formats and over paths which service-acquired systems can receive and display. The term “warfighter” makes

no distinction between “trigger pullers” and intelligence professionals assigned to operational units; all are one target audience. The tailoring of intelligence at the operational level to meet a commander’s needs is critical to mission success. Brigadier General Michael Hayden recently completed a tour as Director for Intelligence for the U.S. European Command and he contends that, “Support to the warfighter is not the highest order of existence for an intelligence professional.” He finds it “a self-limiting and insufficient description which puts intelligence in a responsive and, often, reactive mode.” He suggests that “support to the warfighter” be discarded in favor of something like “be part of the warfight.” The distinction he maintains boils down to this, “If you take our job as supporting the warfighter, you’ll focus on making him happy. If you take your job as being part of the warfight, you’ll focus on making him right.”²¹

The three ensuing sentences in the vision statement each define an intelligence strategy (partnership, information and training). These strategies are intertwined and inseparable. Partnerships are a powerful tool and make it possible to leverage capabilities of others. Today’s broad mission areas require a broad partnership base. This includes partners outside the Department of Defense and the outside government. Non-traditional partners are a by-product of non-traditional missions. Identifying and reaching out to them will require new thinking and alternative approaches. That increasingly diverse threats come at a time of diminishing resources presents theater intelligence with an even greater challenge in meeting warfighter requirements. The combined efforts of intelligence providers extending from assets imbedded in operating units, to the theater intelligence structure, to distant portions of new partnership arrangements are part of the answer.

The information strategy envisions access to a common data to all levels of command (including friends and allies) at the lowest possible security level. Theater intelligence must achieve

this as an integral part of the Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) architecture. The vision lays out aggressive goals in “on-line,” “interactive” and simultaneous “near instantaneous access.” All are achievable but all will require new procedures, applications and mindsets.

Training is the core of successful intelligence support and crucial to the success of the other two strategies. Relevant, realistic training is an investment in the theater’s most important resource - its people. Assigning a high priority to training, properly resourcing for training and protecting training assets is critical to the theater if it is to have the intelligence workforce required to successfully support warfighters into the next century.

BUILDING A COMMON MINDSET

Fundamental Concepts. Theater intelligence planning and execution have underpinnings based upon a set of basic principles and values. Unless these are shared and understood by warfighters and intelligence professionals alike, the structures and approaches being developed for the future will not achieve maximum potential.

Commands and Individuals. Responsibility and accountability are fundamental to theater intelligence. Commands and individuals must be responsible for actions and outputs falling within their purview, role or mission. For example, the theater J2 must be willing to sign-up to his or her responsibility to formulate intelligence policy, plan for theater operations and state theater requirements. Joint Intelligence Centers must accept responsibility for providing quality, substantive intelligence support to the theater. Joint Task Force (JTF) components must accept responsibilities to provide intelligence developed from tactical sensors to the JTF Commander, other JTF components and theater customers as delineated by Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) guidance. Accountability for meeting obligations must also be accepted. While this might appear obvious on the surface, it is not necessarily how the intelligence community operated when resources were plentiful and efforts were narrowly focused. Today areas of interest have broadened, resources have been reduced, duplication is not acceptable and gaps have greater potential adverse impact. Organizations and individuals must trust others to meet their commitments with quality output. Credibility which develops from demonstrated responsibility and accountability, and the trust which must evolve, are inseparable. Commands and individuals must also exhibit discipline. Today's environment must focus on true needs, not "nice-to-haves." In the past, communications and bandwidth constraints defined information flow. Today greater bandwidth and customer "pull"

technologies have largely overcome those constraints. Uninhibited “pull” can overwhelm the system just as “push” did in the past. Self-discipline is essential to remain within system constraints. Requesters and producers must cooperate and work as a team. Finally, commands and individuals must accept, rather than fear or avoid, change. Change offers opportunities for progress. Embracing change will keep intelligence relevant and engaged in a dynamic theater.

Customers and Suppliers. For theater intelligence support to constantly improve, customer-supplier interaction will be vital to identify evolving needs and efficient approaches to satisfy those needs. Constant dialogue and honest timely feedback are essential. An outgrowth of active interchange will be responsiveness and properly targeted output which are at the foundation of credibility and trust.

Theater Intelligence Operations. This last set of fundamentals must guide future intelligence operations planning. First, the goal at every level of command should be all-source fusion. The best support is achieved when all available information is brought together, evaluated and analyzed, and a fused output provided to the customer. Stovepipe systems are not welcome. Navy Captain James FitzSimonds who served as intelligence officer for a battle group during Operation DESERT STORM points out that:

“Fusion will require not only interoperability of theater assets in real time, but also a highly automated capability of positively identifying a wide range of targets from masses of disparate data. As the volume of information generated by a multiplying family of platforms and sensors grows, data fusion becomes increasingly complex. This may require significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence or different concepts of battlefield awareness, in which military goals are attained without the creation of a consolidated picture of the battle space.”²²

Second, theater intelligence is based upon stated requirements. In a constrained resource environment, suppliers can no longer provide initiative production. In today’s world, a passive customer who waits for support, rather than driving the process through stated requirements, will end

up with unfulfilled needs. A stated requirement is the price of admission in today's intelligence world. Third, requirements must be prioritized. Resource allocation and weight of effort are based upon relative priorities. In today's environment, low priority requirements may not be met. Fourth, flexibility and adaptability in theater structures and approaches are essential. Theater intelligence organizations and processes must be flexible enough to incorporate and adopt new capabilities, concepts and approaches. Rigid structures are incompatible with rapid change. Finally, intelligence efforts and plans must be done in concert with operations, plans, communications and personnel experts. Intelligence is not a stand-alone function. It must be done in lock-step with planners and operators to synchronize support. Dissemination planning and execution require active interaction with communicators. Personnel experts play a critical role in augmentation planning and intelligence resizing brought on by resource reductions. Simply put, it's a team effort.

Foundations for the Future. The following facts and approaches must form the basis for all intelligence planning.

Warfighters Drive Intelligence. The warfighter is the ultimate customer of theater intelligence. Only through ongoing dialogue will intelligence suppliers properly anticipate and satisfy warfighter requirements. Warfighter needs must dictate theater intelligence focus, resource allocation and level of effort. Active warfighter involvement is key to intelligence success.

Finite Resources Mandate Prioritization. The intelligence process is requirements driven. What becomes increasingly problematic for theater intelligence is that as the quality of intelligence improves the demand for it grows but, unlike the commercial world, there is no commensurate increase in revenue. The only way to effectively deal with requirements which may exceed production and resource capacity is through prioritization and an understanding that low priority requirements may

go unmet. Accurate prioritization permits resource allocation against the most pressing warfighter needs. Prioritization must be based upon the requester's justification and active discussion. The process is dynamic and interactive.

Process and Support Will Evolve. Intelligence processes and the resulting output must evolve to take full advantage of new capabilities. Evolving requirements and newly emerging capabilities must be anticipated. Anticipating requirements permits early realignment of resources and efforts and better support to warfighters. Dialogue and interaction are critical if intelligence is to truly understand customers' needs. Tools like the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) can simplify this exchange.

Standardization Improves Effectiveness. Standardization of intelligence TTPs reduces ad hoc solutions in a crisis. Cross theater standardization to the maximum extent consistent with theater-unique needs, improves effectiveness of forces operating out-of-theater. TTPs exist for the U.S. commands and some bilateral operations (Korea for example). What is needed now are allied TTPs and coalition TTPs.

Augmentation Enhances Support. Experience shows what an important role JTF augmentation plays in improving joint intelligence expertise, connectivity and capabilities. For example, a theater or a national intelligence support team that deploys with or augments the JTF can provide access to intelligence databases and systems outside the area of operations (AO). This intelligence support team provides the JTF commander with a link from his or her forward-deployed force to an intelligence base in the U.S. and other intelligence commands and agencies outside the AO. Early augmentation with intelligence personnel and equipment improves the ability to provide quality and timely intelligence.

GUIDING THEATER INTELLIGENCE STRATEGIES

Three fundamental and interactive strategies - Partnership, Information and Training - are required to guide the theater intelligence vision. These strategies reflect a blurring of lines between traditional collection, production and dissemination concepts. Along with breaking old definitions and paradigms, these strategies require new mindsets and changes in the way theater intelligence has traditionally operated.

Partnership Strategy. Theater intelligence planning and execution depend upon a set of interrelationships which draw warfighters, national and international agencies, services, reserves, other theaters, commands with world-wide responsibilities, friends and allies, industry and academia into a partnership arrangement tailored to meet warfighters' needs. Information sharing and mutual support are essential to meet prioritized intelligence requirements for joint and/or coalition operations. The paramount objective is to give the warfighter a timely, complete and accurate understanding of the enemy and the battlespace in which we and the enemy operate. This objective can only be achieved through careful planning and with the total integration of resources and capabilities resident with potential partners. To be successful, partnerships must be clearly identified, developed and exercised.

Warfighters are the principal customers therefore, the principal intelligence partner. Intelligence support must be totally integrated across the spectrum of warfighter needs and capabilities. The net result is a set of shared responsibilities. The theater provides strategic and operational-level support down the chain of command and the warfighter provides tactical-level information up the chain. The latter needs to be as seamless as possible to the warfighter (i.e., theater customers could pull tactical sensor data from warfighter file servers).

National and international agencies (including non-traditional partners) must be engaged to meet expanded missions. Potential partners must be sought out before crises become acute. Total integration of effort with national intelligence agencies and centers in other theaters is a clear priority. Theater intelligence is the vital link between national and tactical intelligence. Engaging national intelligence centers in this partnership venture will be one of the greatest challenges to theater intelligence as their focus is predominantly strategic.

The focus for theater intelligence is on joint planning, operations and warfighting, but the services continue to play key theater roles. Service performance of Title 10 responsibilities requires close coordination and dialogue to ensure that properly trained and equipped intelligence personnel are optimally prepared and available for theater operations. Service intelligence centers offer tactics analysis, scientific and technical analysis, and other support to complement theater intelligence capabilities. Increased requirements for detailed tactical-level data in intelligence databases invites expansion of service production roles in support of theater intelligence. Shared production efforts need to be further explored to define the roles, missions, and functions service intelligence can support in the future. They must become part of the fusion process or they will become irrelevant.

Reserves are a key component of theater intelligence plans and operations. The theater goal is to have trained and equipped intelligence reserve personnel and units which are equal, active and efficient partners contributing to satisfy warfighters' needs. The use of reserves must follow a theater plan which includes production needs, training requirements, and unit augmentation. Reserve resources and weight-of-effort must be aligned with theater priorities. In the future, reserve units will become self-contained production sites with full, real-time connectivity to theater JICs via JDISS and JWICS.

Close ties with other theaters enable forces to operate successfully in various CINC's AOR(s) and for theater intelligence to supplement another theater's efforts in crisis or war. Standardized procedures can facilitate a seamless cross-theater flow of capabilities and support. This must be stressed as a mutually beneficial situation for both theater intelligence and the warfighter.

Friends and allies are an important part of theater intelligence planning and execution. The focus should be on how we will operate together in crisis. Intelligence support, interoperability, and connectivity issues and plans must be developed and exercised in realistic scenarios. The key requirement is to develop concepts for information exchange to put the capabilities in place, and to use those capabilities in peacetime. A plan to provide intelligence liaison or augmentation teams to partners during combined or coalition operations will be required.

Private industry offers tremendous potential as a partner in improving intelligence support to warfighters. The commercial sector is facing the same types of issues as the intelligence community: need for increased efficiency, down-sizing, cost-cutting, information explosion, expanding markets, rapid technological advances and extensive training requirements. Participating with industry is vital for theater intelligence, to leverage the investments being made and to deal with these common challenges.

The academic community has not been a traditional partner of military intelligence. Academia, composed of colleges and universities, think tanks, conferences, associations and bodies of scholarly works, has increased interest in national security and defense issues. This convergence of interests and complementary capabilities invites establishing partnerships directed at better support for the warfighter. One obvious strength of this association is in leveraging the knowledge of academic foreign area experts to enhance our ability to analyze an enemy's strategic intentions,

particularly for those countries where we have no Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection. Analyzing the significance of Rwanda, for example, is best accomplished by scholars dedicated to studying that society and region. We cannot, on the other hand, expect the academic community to provide timely or necessarily unbiased information. Nevertheless, they could and should be included in the pre-crisis intelligence estimate process.

Our national interests have become global and the nature of the world situation lends itself to partnership security strategies. It therefore makes sense to create a global partnership to address them. We can no longer do all things for everyone with finite resources. We must engage in building a cooperative intelligence partnership strategy for the future but we must overcome some hurdles. Vice Admiral Dennis Blair, Associate Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, highlights some of the major obstacles which must be surmounted in order to forge this partnership strategy:

“...sharing and dissemination of intelligence information must be weighed against protecting sources, methods and capabilities of the Intelligence Community. The challenge of disseminating intelligence to coalition partners is heightened by the myriad of non-compatible communication systems often possessed by potential foreign partners.”²³

Information Strategy. An intelligence automation architecture capable of providing on-line, interactive, near-instantaneous access across all levels of the warfighting structure is a necessity. The rapid transition to JTF operations requires increasingly flexible and interoperable C4I capabilities. In the Pacific Theater, the USPACOM automated data processing server site (PASS) architecture is the vehicle to achieve this goal. The three keys to PASS success are the fielding of standard intelligence automation processes, robust connectivity, and the ability to integrate with service capabilities and the C4 structure. The weak links are the latter two. Robust connectivity is costly

and will be slow to evolve and service cooperation in the evolving theater intelligence architecture will be critical to providing intelligence access and interoperability to warfighters.

Technological advances and new intelligence structures present tremendous opportunities to enhance support to warfighters. Former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, and then Deputy Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, agreed that INTELINK is the strategic direction for product dissemination and sharing in the intelligence community and that architectures such as imagery and open source be integrated into it.²⁴ With PASS, JDISS, JWICS, INTELINK, combined with soft copy production, the goal of near-instantaneous access to information for all levels of command through "smart push" and customer "pull" is achievable. The "long poles in the tent" will be access to sufficient bandwidth to move the information to all levels of command and the advent of multi-level security (MLS) to allow fully merged Special Compartmented Information (SCI) and General Service (GENSER) information on the same terminal. Some preliminary progress has been made in this area but much work remains. Additionally, the ability to evaluate information being pulled must exist at every access point. The warfighter must be able to evaluate available information to tailor a picture to the commander's needs. This requires that the customer become much more self-reliant than in the past. In the information age, however, this may backfire as the customer becomes more sophisticated, he or she will also become more dominant and demanding. The customer will want intelligence on-line and in a format immediately usable by the commander. Tailoring the product at the far end will not be immediately feasible or desirable to the customer. This process will require further negotiation, training and feedback to refine acceptable production requirements and formats at both ends.

Flexibility is required in production and dissemination. As products and services evolve, low

priority and inefficient efforts will be discontinued to free-up capacity to pursue higher priority, more efficient approaches. Equally important is a shift to "living documents" where information is available on-line and constantly updated to meet rapidly changing customer demands. The "living document" concept will also create a shared and cooperative production process rather than a duplicative and competitive one.

Unclassified information from Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Reuters, CNN and others have been a routine component of intelligence analysis, however, it has usually assumed a relatively low position in the information hierarchy. Classified information was considered better or more reliable simply because it was classified. This mindset must be discarded and a new, broader perspective adopted. As we have seen over the past few years, many problems which command our attention are different from those of the cold-war era. Other overarching issues such as economic competitiveness, weapons of mass destruction, religious and ethnic conflict and environmental issues have emerged to be of greater national interest than in the past. For these new problems we need information, not just intelligence. In fact, the effective exploitation of both open source information coupled with intelligence obtained from special sources will indeed be the most powerful information combination. Access to open source information is expanding exponentially as new information is introduced to on-line networks such as the Internet. Theater intelligence will play an increasingly vital part in accessing and exploiting open source information. In the future, selected operational commanders will be linked directly to open sources as Internet technology is more fully integrated into intelligence support to the warfighter. Integrating the Internet as an intelligence resource today requires caution. Although the quantity of information is vast and the rate at which it can be accessed is rapid, its timeliness and quality remain questionable. As Steven Metz and James Kievit, Associate

Research Professors and Strategic Research Analysts at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, point out;

"The Internet is still in its infancy. Information is badly organized and difficult to use currently. Within a few years, though, presence on the Internet is likely to stabilize. By exploring it today and developing effective methods for finding electronic information an analyst will be ready when the Internet finally makes the leap from luxury to necessity."²⁵

Other very real problems with open source material are its credibility and reliability. Capturing the full potential of the open source information opportunity will require the creation of new concepts, structures and skills to exploit this capability effectively.

New information technologies require new management approaches to address the shift from "push" to "pull" intelligence dissemination. In a "pull" environment, putting encyclopedic reference information forward with the operating forces before a crisis in formats such as CD ROM reduces the volume which must be moved over communications paths. One might call this intelligence "carry-out." This "carry-out" baseline can then be updated with customer "pull" and "smart push." Dissemination is also managed differently in a "pull" architecture as customers largely choose the products they receive. Several information management concepts will be required to reduce both access and information overload and to reduce indiscriminate searching of servers.

To implement the information strategy, a common vision must be shared. Information will be on-line. Access will be via customer "pull" and "smart push" and friends and allies will be incorporated into the information architecture from the outset. The goal is to offer the chain of command access to a common data set. Commanders will be able to tailor their picture and be confident it is consistent with that of other commanders. The challenge is to achieve this goal without restricting access to pertinent information and within growing budget constraints.

Training. Training is investment in the most important resource - people. Training must migrate to teach new methodologies and new technologies. It must focus on basic theater intelligence training and warfighting skills, rather than theory. Mobile training teams, adjunct instructor programs, and video and computer-based training must be pursued.

The investment plan starts with training intelligence personnel. Theater intelligence must focus on training personnel on intelligence systems to support warfighting, on theater intelligence Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs), and on the unique information needs of UN and coalition operations. The environment in which U.S. forces operate and the intelligence requirements associated with these operations have become significantly more complex. The proliferation of sophisticated weapons and command and control systems, a widening array of target countries, a lack of historical databases and the demand for ever increasing timeliness in reporting are but a few factors which impact upon intelligence support. The TTP handbook serves as the theater's guide or "cookbook" for intelligence officers to most effectively meet the requirements of the warfighter. Warfighters must also be educated. A clear understanding of intelligence capabilities and limitations is required to produce realistic expectations and plans. Warfighters and planners must be trained to request and accept essential information that meets their requirements rather than asking for or expecting "nice-to-have" information. It is equally important that theater intelligence not oversell what can be delivered thereby creating false expectations on the part of the warfighters and planners. This can best be done through intelligence exercises or simulations which accurately convey the types, accuracy and timeliness of intelligence reporting that can be realistically expected. It must avoid giving warfighters false or overly optimistic impressions of intelligence capabilities. The intelligence inputs should be less perfect and more ambiguous, making the decisions more challenging. The end

result would be more realistic expectations and increased operational readiness.

The TTPs must also be understood and exercised so that lessons learned can yield improvements. Exercises must be realistic and challenging. Real world data, volume, formats, approaches and communications paths must be used to the greatest extent possible. Joint exercises, in-garrison training, and service training must share a common focus on support to warfighting.

Schoolhouses, both joint and service, must provide relevant instruction. To achieve this, the theater must state clear requirements and review training curricula in both joint and service schools to enhance the relevance of schoolhouse instruction.

Finally, subordinate development should be a priority. The intelligence leadership needs to engage in active discussion with subordinates to explain ideas, encourage response and ideas. This informal mentoring of subordinates, however, is an individual responsibility. It will require a change in mindsets as knowledge, especially among intelligence professionals, has never been easily shared.

Trained personnel are the key to maximizing intelligence support capabilities to warfighters. With training, the vision for theater intelligence can be achieved. Without it, the vision will fail.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The most difficult step in transforming theater intelligence was taken when intelligence leaders recognized the need to review theater intelligence strategies and began formulating a guiding strategic vision. The shift in focus to the warfighter through a three-pronged approach centered on partnership information and training is only the genesis of a concept that now must now be integrated into all aspects of theater intelligence operations and planning.

Several key themes have been stressed in this paper that are essential to the success of the strategic vision for theater intelligence. The first is that a common mindset must be adopted by consumers and producers alike. Quality, cooperation, innovation, constant improvement and synergy are the hallmarks of this new mindset. Building a consensus on the direction of theater intelligence through a shared strategic vision is essential. To do this, a continual dialogue must be established between the customer and the intelligence provider. The second concept involves closer cooperation between Operations, Plans, Intelligence, Cryptology and Communications. Goals can only be reached through teamwork and a collective commitment to the vision. Partnerships are critical. Only by working together can we preserve what is good and create what is needed for the future warfighter. Finally, the vision must drive daily operations as well as the future planning process. Remember, long-range planning and strategic visioning go hand-in-hand. Planning without vision will be misguided and vision without long-range planning cannot be realized.

To achieve the vision, the organizational culture of theater intelligence must be open to change, the allocation of resources must be prudently administered, and information must become a community asset, no longer sequestered behind a “green door.” The challenge for theater intelligence is to achieve the vision or risk becoming irrelevant. Theater intelligence can be reshaped without

degrading its capability to support the requirements of the 21st century warfighter. It can be made smarter and better. Intelligence professionals should not be afraid to ask questions that go to the heart of how this can be done. Rather, we must seek a collaborative approach which engages all partners in seeking the answers. A strategic vision which guides the transition into the future will keep theater intelligence relevant and useful to the nation's warfighters, and ultimately the nation.

ENDNOTES

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3. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War (New York, Warner Books, 1993), p. 185.
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5. Dr. John Hollister Hedley, Checklist for the Future of Intelligence (Gaithersburg, MD: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1995), p. 1.
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7. "A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," Washington, DC: U.S.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 17-18.
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9. Gen. Gordon R. Sullivan and Col. James M. Dubik, War in the Information Age (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 6, 1994), p. 14.
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12. Gen. Charles A. Horner, USAF, "Space Systems Pivotal to Modern Warfare," Defense 94 4, p. 20.
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18. Perry M. Smith et al., Creating Strategic Vision: Long Range Planning for National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), pp.12-22 *passim*.
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20. USPACOM's Vision for Theater Intelligence is articulated in a series of messages resident on INTELINK on the PACOM home page under USCINCPAC information. The series, taken as a whole, is a statement of policy and courses of action.
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